Group-identity and long-run cooperation: an experiment

Gabriele Camera and Lukas Hohl

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2021, vol. 188, issue C, 903-915

Abstract: We stress-test the limits of the power of group identity in the context of cooperation by constructing laboratory economies where participants confront an indefinitely repeated social dilemma as strangers. Group identity is artificially induced by random assignment to color-coded groups, and reinforced by an initial cooperation task played in-group and in fixed pairs. Subsequently subjects interact in-group and out-group in large economies, as strangers. Indefinite repetition guarantees full cooperation is an equilibrium. Decision-makers can discriminate based on group affiliation, but cannot observe past behaviors. We find no evidence of group biases. This suggests that group effects are less likely to emerge when players cannot easily observe and compare characteristics on which to base categorizations and behaviors.

Keywords: Large groups; Indefinitely repeated game; Social norms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Group-identity and long-run cooperation: an experiment (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:188:y:2021:i:c:p:903-915

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.06.017

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