United We Stand: On the Benefits of Coordinated Punishment

Vicente Calabuig, Natalia Jimenez, Gonzalo Olcina and Ismael Rodriguez-Lara
Additional contact information
Vicente Calabuig: University of Valencia
Natalia Jimenez: Universidad Pablo de Olavide
Gonzalo Olcina: University of Valencia

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: Coordinated punishment occurs when punishment decisions are complements; i.e., this punishment device requires a specific number of punishers to be effective; otherwise, no damage will be inflicted on the target. While societies often rely on this punishment device, its benefits are unclear compared with uncoordinated punishment, where punishment decisions are substitutes. We argue that coordinated punishment can prevent the free-riding of punishers and show, both theoretically and experimentally, that this may be beneficial for cooperation in a team investment game, compared with uncoordinated punishment.

Keywords: Team investment game; coordinated punishment; uncoordinated punishment; freeriding; cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D02 D03 D69 J01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/373/

Related works:
Working Paper: United we stand: On the benefits of coordinated punishment (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:22-12

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