United we stand: On the benefits of coordinated punishment
Vicente Calabuig (),
Natalia Jiménez (),
Gonzalo Olcina () and
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Vicente Calabuig: ERICES, Universidad de Valencia
No 19.01, Working Papers from Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics
Coordinated punishment requires a specific number of punishers to be effective (otherwise, no damage is inflicted on the target) but it also exhibits returns to scale. While societies often rely on this punishment device, its benefits are unclear compared with uncoordinated punishment, where punishment decisions are substitutes. We argue that coordinated punishment can prevent the free-riding of punishers and show, both theoretically and experimentally, that this may be beneficial for cooperation in a team investment game, compared with uncoordinated punishment. Nevertheless, efficiency is not enhanced since punishment is more extensively used when it is coordinated.
Keywords: Team investment game; coordinated punishment; uncoordinated punishment; free-riding; cooperation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D03 D69 J01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 63 pages
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pab:wpaper:19.01
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