Group Decision-Making in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study

Alexander Elbittar (), Andrei Gomberg and Laura Sour

No 407, Working Papers from Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM

Abstract: Many rent-sharing decisions in a society are result from a bargaining process between groups of individuals (such as between the executive and the legislative branches of government, between legislative factions, between corporate management and shareholders, etc.). The purpose of this work is to conduct a laboratory study of the effect of different voting procedures on group decision-making in the context of ultimatum bargaining. An earlier study (Bornstein and Yaniv, [2]) has suggested that when the bargaining game is played by unstructured groups of agents, rather than by individuals, the division of the payoff is substantially affected in favor of the ultimatum-proposers. Our theoretical arguments suggest that one explanation for this could be implicit voting rules within groups. We propose to explicitly structure the group decision-making as voting and study the impact of different voting rules on the bargaining outcome.

Keywords: Bargaining games; group decision making and experimental design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2004-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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http://ftp.itam.mx/pub/academico/inves/gomberg/04-07.pdf First version, 2004 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Group Decision-Making in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cie:wpaper:0407

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