Group Formation and Voter Participation

Helios Herrera () and Cesar Martinelli

No 502, Working Papers from Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM

Abstract: We present a mobilization model of large elections with endogenous formation of voter groups. Citizens decide whether to be followers or become leaders (activists) and try to bring other citizens to vote for their preferred party. In the (unique) pure strategy equilibrium, the number of leaders favoring each party is a function of the cost of activism and the mportance of the election. Expected turnout and winning margin in the election are, in turn, a function of the number of leaders and the strength of social interactions. The model predicts a non monotonic relationship between expected turnout and winning margin in large elections.

Keywords: Vote´x Paradox; Endogenous Leaders; Turnout; Winning Margin (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2005-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://ftp.itam.mx/pub/academico/inves/martinelli/05-02.pdf First version, 2004-05-01 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Group formation and voter participation (2006)
Working Paper: Group Formation and Voter Participation (2006)
Working Paper: Group Formation and Voter Participation (2006)
Working Paper: Group Formation and Voter Participation (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cie:wpaper:0502

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