Monotone Implementation

Levent Ulku ()
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Levent Ulku: Centro de Investigacion Economica (CIE), Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM)

No 1004, Working Papers from Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM

Abstract: We study a class of direct revelation mechanisms which implement outcome functions satisfying a monotonicity condition. Monotone implementation is in dominant strategy equilibrium when values are private and in ex post Nash equilibrium when values are interdependent. The original Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism is not a monotone implementation mechanism although its many extensions to interdependent value models are. The extraction mechanisms of Cremer and McLean (1985) are a special form of monotone implementation mechanisms for finite type spaces.

Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cie:wpaper:1004

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