Vote Revelation: Empirical Characterization of Scoring Rules

Andrei Gomberg

No 1102, Working Papers from Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM

Abstract: In this paper I consider choice correspondences defined on an extended domain: the decisions are assumed to be taken not by individuals, but by committees and, in addition to the budget sets, committee composition is observable and variable. For the case of varying committees choosing over a fixed set of two alternatives I provide a full characterization of committee choice structures that may be rationalized with sincere scoring. For the general case of multiple alternatives a necessary implication of choice by sincere scoring is provided.

Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://ftp.itam.mx/pub/academico/inves/gomberg/11-02.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cie:wpaper:1102

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Diego Dominguez ().