On Equal Cost Sharing in the Provision of an Excludable Public Good

Jordi Masso, Antonio Nicolo', Tridib Sharma and Levent Ülkü ()
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Levent Ülkü: Centro de Investigación Económica (CIE), Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)

No 1306, Working Papers from Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM

Abstract: We study the effciency and fairness properties of the equal cost sharing mechanism in the provision of a binary and excludable public good. According to the maximal welfare loss criterion, equal cost sharing is optimal within the class of strategyproof, individually rational and no-budgetde cit mechanisms only when there are 2 agents. In general the equal cost

Keywords: Excludable public good; Equal cost sharing; Maximal welfare loss (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cie:wpaper:1306

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