Gresham's Law Type Equilibria in the Kiyotaki-Wright Models

Juan M. Renero ()
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Juan M. Renero: Departamento de Economica, Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM)

No 9411, Working Papers from Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM

Abstract: I establish new existence and welfare results for the Kiyotaki-Wright model (JPE, 1989). I show that good intrinsic properties are not necessary for an object to be universally accepted in equilibrium. Furthermore, bad objects may be socially desirable as media of exchange. One result is that for any number of goods larger than two and an open set of parameters, there exists a multiple equilibria in which the most costly to-store object is universally accepted. I also prove that there exists a contimuum of steady states of this kind. Moreover, there exist equilibria converging to each steady state of that continuum. For the case of three goods and no fiat object another result is that such equilibria may Pareto dominate other equilibria in which other less costly to-store objects are universally accepted. Moreover, steady states of this type may not exist while there exists a continuum of steady states in which the most costly to-store is universally accepted. In fact, these steady states may be the only ones which exist.

Pages: 38 pages
Date: 1994-06
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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