 Monetary Exchange as a Social Convention: Emergence and Stability of an Intermediating CommodityPhillip Johnson
No 9708, Working Papers from Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM Abstract: This paper investigates the stability of monetary exchange equilibria and the conditions necessary for an equilibrium of this type to emerge endogenously. Previous research on money as a medium of exchange has depended on either initial conditions or steady state conditions to pinpoint equilibria, These approaches are not satisfactory for addressing the issue of emergence, either because the determining element is exogeneous, or because there are multiple equilibria without criteria for selecting between them. We construct an N-person non-cooperative anonymous game from an economy with many commodities and bilateral exchange. The environment is restricted so that in addition to direct barter opportunities there is a commodity - a token commodity with no value in consumption - which cab be used for intermediate exchanges. We make use of recent advances in evolutionary learning in games pioneered in Young (1003) and Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) to characterize conditions under which monetary trade is typically observed in the long run regardless of initial conditions and discuss how informational assumptions affect transition time. Pages: 20 pages There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cie:wpaper:9708 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Working Papers from Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM Contact information at EDIRC. |
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