Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game

Phillip Johnson, David Levine and Wolfgang Pesendorfer ()
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Phillip Johnson: Centro de Investigacion Economica (CIE), Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM)

No 9805, Working Papers from Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM

Abstract: In an environment of anonymous random matching, Kandori [1992] showed that with a sufficiently rich class of simple information systems the folk theorem holds. We specialize to the Prisoner's Dilemma and examine the stochastic stability of a process of learning and evolution in this setting. If the benefit of future cooperation is too small, then there is no cooperation. When the benefit of cooperation is large then only cooperation will survive in the very long run.

Pages: 35 pages
Date: 1998-02
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Working Paper: Evolution and Information in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cie:wpaper:9805

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