Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Decentralization?

Michel Poitevin

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: This survey presents within a single model three theories of decentralization of decision-making within organizations based on private information and incentives. Renegotiation, collusion, and limits on communication are three sufficient conditions for decentralization to be optimal. Cet article présente dans un cadre unifié un survol de trois théories de la décentralisation de la prise de décision dans les organisations. Ces théories reposent sur la présence d'information privée et des incitations qui en découlent. La renégociation, la collusion et les limites à la communication représentent trois conditions suffisantes pouvant expliquer l'optimalité de la décentralisation.

Keywords: Organizational design; private information; decentralization; Design organisationnel; information privée; décentralisation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-09-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

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https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/2000s-32.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Can the theory of incentives explain decentralization? (2000)
Working Paper: Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Devcentralization? (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:2000s-32

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