Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Devcentralization?

Michel Poitevin

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: This survey presents within a single model three theories of decentralization of decision-making within organizations based on private information and incentives.

Keywords: INFORMATION; DECENTRALIZATION; DECISION MAKING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Can the theory of incentives explain decentralization? (2000)
Journal Article: Can the theory of incentives explain decentralization? (2000)
Working Paper: Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Decentralization? (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:2000-13

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