Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities

Sandro Brusco and Giuseppe Lopomo

Levine's Bibliography from UCLA Department of Economics

Date: 2004-09-01
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