Why do Politicians Delegate?

Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini

Levine's Bibliography from UCLA Department of Economics

Date: 2005-10-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Working Paper: Why do Politicians Delegate? (2005)
Working Paper: Why Do Politicians Delegate? (2005)
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