Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private Value Auctions

Thomas Palfrey

Theory workshop papers from UCLA Department of Economics

Date: 2002-04-18
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (278)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.ucla.edu/iobara/seminar/auction.final.pdf
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Can't connect to economics.ucla.edu:80 (A connection attempt failed because the connected party did not properly respond after a period of time, or established connection failed because connected host has failed to respond.) (http://www.econ.ucla.edu/iobara/seminar/auction.final.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> http://economics.ucla.edu/seminar/auction.final.pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions (2002)
Working Paper: Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-value Auctions (2000)
Working Paper: Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions (2000)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cla:uclatw:357966000000000089

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Theory workshop papers from UCLA Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by David K. Levine ().