Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-value Auctions

Thomas Palfrey, Jacob Goeree and Charles Holt

No 1073, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Date: 2000-02
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Published: Journal of Economic Theory , Vol. 104, pp. 247-272 (2002)

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Journal Article: Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions (2002)
Working Paper: Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private Value Auctions (2002)
Working Paper: Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions (2000)
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