The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes

John Ledyard and Thomas Palfrey

No 1092, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Keywords: public goods; interim efficiency; voting; simple mechanism. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2000-10
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes (2003)
Journal Article: The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes (2002)
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