The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes

John Ledyard and Thomas Palfrey

Levine's Working Paper Archive from David K. Levine

Date: 2003-01-21
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Related works:
Journal Article: The approximation of efficient public good mechanisms by simple voting schemes (2002)
Working Paper: The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes (2000)
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