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Budget Balancedness and Optimal Income Taxation

Marcus Berliant () and Frank Page

No 1164, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Abstract: We make two main contributions to the theory of optimal income taxation. First, assuming conditions sufficient for existence of a Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism, we show that if, in addition, agents' preferences satisfy an extended notion of single crossing called capacity constrained single crossing, then there exists a Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism that is budget balancing . Second, we show that, even without capacity contrained single crossing, existence of a , Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism is guaranteed if the set of agent types contains no atoms.

Keywords: optimal income taxation; budget balancedness; mechanism design; implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-05
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Journal Article: Budget Balancedness and Optimal Income Taxation (2006) Downloads
Working Paper: Budget Balancedness and Optimal Income Taxation (2004) Downloads
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