Budget Balancedness and Optimal Income Taxation

Marcus Berliant and Frank Page

Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2006, vol. 8, issue 3, 409-451

Abstract: We make two contributions to the theory of optimal income taxation. First, assuming conditions sufficient for existence of a Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism, we show that if agents' preferences satisfy an extended notion of single crossing called capacity constrained single crossing, then there exists a Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism that is budget balancing. Second, we show that, even without capacity constrained single crossing, existence of a budget balancing Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism is guaranteed if the set of agent types contains no atoms.

Date: 2006
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00271.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Budget Balancedness and Optimal Income Taxation (2004)
Working Paper: Budget Balancedness and Optimal Income Taxation (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:8:y:2006:i:3:p:409-451

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1097-3923

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Public Economic Theory is currently edited by Rabah Amir, Gareth Myles and Myrna Wooders

More articles in Journal of Public Economic Theory from Association for Public Economic Theory Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().