Does Competition for the Field Improve Cost Efficiency? Evidence from the London Bus Tendering Model

Miguel Amaral, Stephane Saussier () and Anne Yvrande-Billon
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Miguel Amaral: ATOM – U. of Paris I Sorbonne

No 2006-14, Working Papers from Center for Network Industries and Infrastructure (CNI)

Abstract: In this paper we investigate the relationship between auctions’ results and the number of bidders for local transportation contracts in London. Using an original database concerning 294 local transportation routes we find that a higher number of bidders is associated with a lower cost of service. This finding, in addition of being one of the first empirical test of a crucial and understudied theoretical issue has important policy implications, especially for countries in which bids are organized such that only few bidders are allowed to answer (e.g. France).

Keywords: public services; transportation; franchise bidding; public-private partnerships; winner’s curse; auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H0 H7 K00 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2006-09-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-law, nep-pbe and nep-ure
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Working Paper: Does Competition for the Field Improve Cost Efficiency? Evidence from the London Bus Tendering Model (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cni:wpaper:2006-14

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