Delegation, Externalities and Organizational Design
Axel Gautier () and
Dimitri Paolini ()
Working Paper CRENoS from Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia
In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the …first period and across agents.
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Journal Article: Delegation, externalities and organizational design (2009)
Working Paper: Delegation, Externalities and Organizational Design (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cns:cnscwp:200710
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