Delegation, Externalities and Organizational Design

Axel Gautier () and Dimitri Paolini

Working Paper CRENoS from Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia

Abstract: In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the …first period and across agents.

Date: 2007
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://crenos.unica.it/crenos/sites/default/files/wp/07-10.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Delegation, externalities and organizational design (2009)
Working Paper: Delegation, Externalities and Organizational Design (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cns:cnscwp:200710

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