Delegation, externalities and organizational design

Axel Gautier () and Dimitri Paolini

Economics Bulletin, 2009, vol. 29, issue 4, 2683-2692

Abstract: In a repeated interaction between a principal and two agents with inter-agents externalities and asymmetric information, we show that optimal decentralization within the organization is limited to the first period and across agents.

Keywords: Delegation; Hierarchy; Asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-10-28
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http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2009/Volume29/EB-09-V29-I4-P21.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Delegation, Externalities and Organizational Design (2007)
Working Paper: Delegation, Externalities and Organizational Design (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00532

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