Happiness and Preferences in a Legality Social Dilemma Comparing the Direct and Indirect Approach

Fiammetta Rossetti, Vittorio Pelligra, Germana Corrado and Leonardo Becchetti

Working Paper CRENoS from Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia

Abstract: We investigate players' preferences in a multiplayer prisoner's dilemma by comparing results from a direct (satisfaction based) and an indirect (choice based) approach. Both approaches provide strong evidence of preference heterogeneity, with players who cooperate above median being less affected in their choice by monetary payoffs vis-à-vis the public good component. The combination of a legality frame plus a conformity information design reduces further the relative preference (satisfaction) for the non-cooperative choice for such players. Our findings support the hypothesis that (part of the) players have, in addition to the standard self-interest component, an other-regarding preference argument that is further satisfied in the legality frame plus conformity design.

Keywords: Legality Game; Laboratoty Experiment; Corruption; conformity; Analysis of Collective Decision-Making; Redistribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-hpe
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Working Paper: Happiness and Preferences in a Legality Social Dilemma: Comparing the Direct and Indirect Approach (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cns:cnscwp:201604

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