PAC Spending and Roll Call Voting in the U.S. House: An Empirical Extension
Peter Calcagno () and
No 4, Working Papers from Department of Economics and Finance, College of Charleston
This paper expands the investigation of how PAC spending affects the roll call voting behavior to the U.S. House of Representative. Using a theoretical framework which draws on the voting literature, we develop models that explain Representative’s voting behavior in a pre-PAC and post-PAC world. Testing both models we find weak support for a Downsian view of voting participation in the first model. The second model supports the alteration of voting incentives resulting from PAC spending. We find that PACs have a positive effect on voting participation. These results are consistent with earlier findings that investigate Senate behavior.
Keywords: Political Action Committees; Roll Call Voting; Congressional Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cofc.edu/~econfinc/workingpapers/calcagno_Jackson.pdf First version, 2007 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found
Journal Article: PAC Spending and Roll Call Voting in the U.S. House: An Empirical Extension (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:coc:wpaper:4
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Department of Economics and Finance, College of Charleston Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Calcagno ().