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PAC Spending and Roll Call Voting in the U.S. House: An Empirical Extension

Peter Calcagno () and John Jackson ()
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John Jackson: Auburn University

Economics Bulletin, 2008, vol. 4, issue 25, 1-11

Abstract: This paper expands the investigation of how PAC spending affects the roll call voting behavior to the U.S. House of Representatives. Using a theoretical framework which draws on the voting literature, we develop two models that explain Representatives' voting behavior in a pre-PAC and post-PAC world. We find weak support for a Downsian view of voting participation in the first model, and strong support for the alteration of voting incentives resulting from PAC spending in the second model. These results are consistent with earlier findings that investigate Senate behavior.

JEL-codes: D7 H0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-08-07
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