PAC Spending and Roll Call Voting in the U.S. House: An Empirical Extension
Peter Calcagno () and
John Jackson ()
Additional contact information
John Jackson: Auburn University
Economics Bulletin, 2008, vol. 4, issue 25, 1-11
This paper expands the investigation of how PAC spending affects the roll call voting behavior to the U.S. House of Representatives. Using a theoretical framework which draws on the voting literature, we develop two models that explain Representatives' voting behavior in a pre-PAC and post-PAC world. We find weak support for a Downsian view of voting participation in the first model, and strong support for the alteration of voting incentives resulting from PAC spending in the second model. These results are consistent with earlier findings that investigate Senate behavior.
JEL-codes: D7 H0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: PAC Spending and Roll Call Voting in the U.S. House: An Empirical Extension
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08d70027
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().