Oligopsony and Minimum Wages

Hernán Vallejo
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Hernán Vallejo: Universidad de los Andes

Ensayos de Economía from Universidad Nacional de Colombia Sede Medellín

Abstract: This article presents a model of oligopsony. It considers different conjectural variations that cover the whole range between the extreme cases of monopsony and perfect competition, such as Collusion, Threat, Cournot, Stackelberg, and Bertrand, and compares them in terms of prices, quantities, profits, markdown, price elasticity of supply and welfare. It also considers the impact of minimum wages, under the different conjectures analyzed.

Keywords: Oligopsony; collusion; threat; Cournot; Stackelberg; Bertrand; markdown; minimum wage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 J21 J38 J48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-gth
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https://revistas.unal.edu.co/index.php/ede/article/view/110347/94400

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000418:022885

DOI: 10.15446/ede.v34n65.110347

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