Political Competition and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico
Leopoldo Fergusson (),
Horacio Larreguy () and
Juan Riaño Rodríguez ()
Documentos de Trabajo LACEA from The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA
We develop a model of the politics of state strengthening undertaken by incumbent parties that have a comparative advantage in clientelism rather than in public good provision. The model suggests that, when politically challenged by opponents, clientelistic incumbents may oppose investing in state capacity. We provide empirical support for the model’s implications using policy decisions that reflect local state capacity choices, and a difference-in-differences identification strategy that exploits a national shock that threatened the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party’s hegemony in the early 1960s with varying intensity across the various Mexican municipalities.
Keywords: State capacity; political competition; land allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Working Paper: Political Competition and State Capacity Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000518:016517
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