Political Competition and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico

Leopoldo Fergusson, Horacio Larreguy and Juan Riano

No 22-1293, TSE Working Papers from Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)

Abstract: We develop a model of the politics of state capacity building undertaken by incum-bent parties that have a comparative advantage in clientelism rather than in public goods provision. The model predicts that, when challenged by opponents, clientelistic incumbents have the incentive to prevent investments in state capacity. We provide empirical support for the model’s implications by studying policy decisions by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) that affected local state capacity across Mex-ican municipalities and over time. Our difference-in-differences and instrumental variable identification strategies exploit a national shock that threatened the Mexican government’s hegemony in the early 1960s. The intensity of this shock, which varied across municipalities, was partly explained by severe droughts that occurred during the 1950s.

JEL-codes: D72 D73 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Political Competition and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico (2022)
Working Paper: Political Competition and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico (2022)
Working Paper: Political Competition and State Capacity Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico (2020)
Working Paper: Political Competition and State Capacity: Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tse:wpaper:126517

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