National R&D cooperation: A special type of strategic policy

Massimo Motta ()

No 1992002, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: D'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) model is extended to study alternative configurations of research agreements. Analogies with the cartel literature are found: under certain conditions on spillover values, outsiders benefit more than participants in R&D agreements. If cooperative spillovers are high enough, though, national R&D cooperation has the same beneficial effect as subsidies in strategic trade policies. Unlike the latter, however, it is not necessarily harmful to foreigners, and retaliation may leave both countries better off than non-cooperation. Finally, international R&D cooperation would be Pareto-superior to both retaliation and non-cooperation for high enough spillovers.

JEL-codes: D43 F13 L41 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992-01-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1992002

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