Exchange and Optimality

Sayantan Ghosal and Heracles Polemarchakis
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Heracles Polemarchakis: CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

No 1994072, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: A social state is irreducible if, and only if for any non-trivial partition of individuals with two groups, there exists another feasible social state at which every individual in the first group is equally well-off and someone strictly better-off. Competitive equilibria decentralize irreducible Pareto optimal social states.

Keywords: social states; optimality; exchange (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 D60 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-12-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Exchange and optimality (1999)
Working Paper: Exchange and optimality (1999)
Working Paper: Exchange and Optimality (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1994072

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