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Exchange and Optimality

S. Ghosal and Heracles M. Polemarchakis
Additional contact information
S. Ghosal: University of London
Heracles M. Polemarchakis: CORE, Universite Catholique de Louvain

Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Sourendra Nath Ghosal and Sayantan Ghosal

No 1133, Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers from Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University

Abstract: A feasible social state is irreducible if and only if, for any non-trivial partition of individuals with two groups, there exists another feasible social state at which every individual in the first group is equally well-off and someone strictly better-off. Competitive equilibria decentralize irreducible Pareto optimal social states.

Keywords: Social states; optimality; exchange (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 D60 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 1996-09
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Published in Economic Theory (April 1999), 13(3): 629-642

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Journal Article: Exchange and optimality (1999) Downloads
Working Paper: Exchange and optimality (1999)
Working Paper: Exchange and Optimality (1994) Downloads
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