Strategic learning in games with symmetric information

Olivier Gossner and Nicolas Vieille ()

No 1998023, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This paper studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponent's. We characterize equilibrium paysoffs in termsof simple strategies in which an explanation phase is followed by a payoff acquisition phase.

Keywords: Public value of information; games with incomplete information; bandit problems. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-04-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic learning in games with symmetric information (2003)
Working Paper: Strategic learning in games with symmetric information (2003)
Working Paper: Strategic Learning in Games with Symmetric Information (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1998023

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