Strategic learning in games with symmetric information

Nicolas Vieille () and Olivier Gossner

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Abstract: This article studies situations in which agents do not initially know the effect of their decisions, but learn from experience the payoffs induced by their choices and their opponents'. We chararacterize equilibrium payoffs in terms of simple strategies in which an exploration phase is followed by a payoff acquisition phase.

Keywords: Public value of information; Games with incomplete information; Bandit problems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-01-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, Vol.42,n°1, pp.25-47. ⟨10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00535-3⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic learning in games with symmetric information (2003)
Working Paper: Strategic Learning in Games with Symmetric Information (2000)
Working Paper: Strategic learning in games with symmetric information (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00464978

DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00535-3

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