Strategic complements and substitutes in bilateral oligopolies

Francis Bloch and Hélène Ferrer

No 1998030, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: This note analyzes the effect of product complementarity in a bilateral oligopoly. We show that offers of traders on the two sides of the market are strategic complements (substitutes) if and only if the two goods are substitutes (complements). The outcome of the bilateral oligopoly game converges monotonically to the competitive equilibrium, as theelasticity of substitution between the goods decreases to [minus infinite].

Keywords: bilateral oligopolies; strategic substitutes and complements. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-05-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic complements and substitutes in bilateral oligopolies (2001)
Working Paper: Strategic complements and substitutes in bilateral oligopolies (2001)
Working Paper: Strategic complements and substitutes in bilateral oligopolies (2001)
Working Paper: Strategic complements and substitutes in bilateral oligopolies (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1998030

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