Strategic complements and substitutes in bilateral oligopolies

Francis Bloch and Hélène Ferrer ()
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Hélène Ferrer: CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) from HAL

Abstract: This paper characterizes the equilibrium of a bilateral oligopoly where traders have CES utility functions. We show that the offers of traders on the two sides of the market are strategic substitutes if and only if the goods are complements.

Keywords: Bilateral oligopoly; Strategic substitutes and complements; CES utility functions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Economics Letters, 2001, 70 (1), pp.83-87. ⟨10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00343-8⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic complements and substitutes in bilateral oligopolies (2001)
Working Paper: Strategic complements and substitutes in bilateral oligopolies (2001)
Working Paper: Strategic complements and substitutes in bilateral oligopolies (2001)
Working Paper: Strategic complements and substitutes in bilateral oligopolies (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-02174881

DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00343-8

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