Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players

Olivier Gossner

No 1998035, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We explore the consequences of the assumptions used in modern cryptographywhen applied to repeated games with public communication. Technically speaking, we model agents by polynomial Turing machinesand assume the existence of a trapdoor function. Under these conditions, we prove a Folk Theorem in which the minmax level of players has to be taken in correlated strategies instead of mixed strategies..

Keywords: repeated games; bounded rationality; correlation; Turing machines; cryptography (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-06-01
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players (1999)
Working Paper: Repeated Games played by Cryptographically Sophesticated Players (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:1998035

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