Repeated Games played by Cryptographically Sophesticated Players

Olivier Gossner

Working Papers from Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor.

Abstract: One of the main goals of bounded rationality models is to understand the limitations of agent's abilities in building representations of strategic situations as maximization problems and in solving these problems. Modern cryptography relies on the assumption that agents's computations should be implementable by polynominal Turing machines and on the exstence of a trapdoor function. Uder those assumption, we prove that very correlated equilibrium of the original infinitely repreated game can be implemented through public communication only.

Keywords: GAME THEORY mathematiques et informatique; 200; avenue de la Republique 9 2001 Nanterre CEDEX. 23p. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Related works:
Working Paper: Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players (1999)
Working Paper: Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players (1998)
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