Nash-Walras equilibria of a large economy

Enrico Minelli and Heracles Polemarchakis
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Heracles Polemarchakis: Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain la Neuve, Belgium

No 1999043, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: Individuals exchange contracts for the deliveryof commodities in competitive markets and, simultaneously, act strategically; actions affect utilities across individuals directlyor through the payoffs of contracts. This encompasses economies with asymmetric information. Nash-Walras equilibria exist for large economies, even if utilityfunctions are not quasi - concave and choice sets are not convex, which is the case in standard settings; the separation of the purchase from the sale of contracts and the pooling of the deliveries on contracts guarantee that the markets for commodities clear.

Keywords: Nash; Walras; equilibrium; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D50 D52 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-06-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Nash-walras Equilibria of a Large Economy (1999)
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