Nash-walras Equilibria of a Large Economy

Enrico Minelli and Heracles M. Polemarchakis
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Heracles M. Polemarchakis: CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain] - UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain

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Abstract: Individuals exchange contracts for the delivery of commodities in competitive markets and, simultaneously, act strategically; actions affect utilities across individuals directly or through the payoffs of contracts. This encompasses economies with asymmetric information. Nash - walras equilibria exist for large economies, even if utility functions are not quasi - concave and choice sets are not convex, which is the case in standard settings; the separation of the purchase from the sale of contracts and the pooling of the deliveries on contracts guarantee that the markets for commodities clear.

Keywords: Nash; walras; equilibrium; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Published in 1999

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Working Paper: Nash-Walras equilibria of a large economy (1999)
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