Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies

Gaël Giraud and Céline Rochon

No 2001018, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We present a feasible strategic market mechanism with finitely many agents whose Nash, semi-strong Nash and coalition-proof Nash equilibria fully implement the Walrasian equilibria. We define a strategic equilibrium concept, called correlated semi-strong equilibrium, and show that the Walrasian equilibria can be implemented by the these equilibria, and also by the coalition-proof correlated equilibria of our mechanism. We show that these two concepts, suitably modified with transfers, fully implement the Pareto optimal allocations. We extend to semi-strong correlated equilibria Aumann's Bayesian interpretation of correlated equilibria.

Keywords: coalition-proofness; correlation; semi-strong equilibrium; implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies (2002)
Working Paper: Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2001018

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