Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies

Gaël Giraud and Céline Rouchon
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Céline Rouchon: THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We present a feasible strategic market mechanism with finitely many agents whose Nash, semi-strong Nash and coalition-proof Nash equilibria fully implement the Walrasian equilibria. We define a strategic equilibrium concept, called correlated semi-strong equilibrium, and show that the Walrasian equilibria can be implemented by these equilibria, and also by the coalition-proof correlated equilibria of our mechanism. We show that these two concepts, suitably modified with transfers, fully implement the Pareto optimal allocations.

Keywords: Coalition-proofness; Correlation; Semi-strong equilibrium; Implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-12
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Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002, 38 (4), pp.441-463. ⟨10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00077-0⟩

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Journal Article: Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies (2002)
Working Paper: Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00498879

DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(02)00077-0

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