On strategic complementarity conditions in Bertrand oligopoly

Rabah Amir () and Isabel Grilo

No 2001049, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: For Bertrand duopoly with linear costs, we establish via a single counterexample that: (i) A new monotone transformation of the firms' profit functions may lead to the supermodularity of transformed profits when the standard log and identity transformations both fail, and (ii) Topkis's notion of critical sufficient condition for monotonicity of a Bertrand firm's best-reply correspondence cannot be extended to rely only on positive unit costs.

Keywords: Price competition; Supermodularity; Singlecrossing property; Critical sufficient condition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-10
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Related works:
Journal Article: On strategic complementarity conditions in Bertrand oligopoly (2003)
Working Paper: On strategic complementarity conditions in Bertrand oligopoly (2003)
Working Paper: Strategic Complementarity Conditions in Bertrand Oligopoly (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2001049

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