Strategic Complementarity Conditions in Bertrand Oligopoly

Rabah Amir () and Isabel Grilo
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Isabel Grilo: CORE, Louvain-la-neuve

No 2000-11, CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics

Abstract: This note relates to Topkis (1995). We establish via counterexample that:(i) A new monotone transformation of the firms' profit functions may lead to cardinal complementarity when the standard log and identity transformations both fail, and (ii) Topkis's notion of critical sufficient condition for monotone comparative statics of a firm cannot be extended to rely only on positive unit costs.

Keywords: supermodularity; single-crossing property; price competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2000-12
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Related works:
Journal Article: On strategic complementarity conditions in Bertrand oligopoly (2003)
Working Paper: On strategic complementarity conditions in Bertrand oligopoly (2003)
Working Paper: On strategic complementarity conditions in Bertrand oligopoly (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuieci:2000-11

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