How to share when context matters: The Möbius value as a generalized solution for cooperative games

Antoine Billot and Jacques Thisse

No 2002025, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: All quasivalues rest on a set of three basic axioms (efficiency, null player, and additivity), which are augmented with positivity for random order values, and with positivity and partnership for weighted values. We introduce the concept of Moebius value associated with a o sharing system and show that this value is characterized by the above three axioms. We then establish that (i) a Moebius value is a random o order value if and only if the sharing system is stochastically rationalizable and (ii) a Moebius value is a weighted value if and only if the o sharing system satisfies the Luce choice axiom.

Keywords: Shapley value; quasivalue; Moebius inverse (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D46 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-04
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Related works:
Journal Article: How to share when context matters: The Mobius value as a generalized solution for cooperative games (2005)
Working Paper: How to share when context matters: The Mobius value as a generalized solution for cooperative games (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2002025

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