How to share when context matters: The Mobius value as a generalized solution for cooperative games

Jacques Thisse and Antoine Billot

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Abstract: All quasivalues rest on a set of three basic axioms (efficiency, null player, and additivity), which are augmented with positivity for random order values, and with positivity and partnership for weighted values. We introduce the concept of Möbius value associated with a sharing system and show that this value is characterized by the above three axioms. We then establish that (i) a Möbius value is a random order value if and only if the sharing system is stochastically rationalizable and (ii) a Möbius value is a weighted value if and only if the sharing system satisfies the Luce choice axiom.

Keywords: Shapley value; Quasivalue; Möbius inverse (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2005, 41 (8), pp.1007-1029. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.12.008⟩

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Journal Article: How to share when context matters: The Mobius value as a generalized solution for cooperative games (2005)
Working Paper: How to share when context matters: The Möbius value as a generalized solution for cooperative games (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00754051

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.12.008

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