International environmental agreements - The role of foresight

Effrosyni Diamantoudi () and Eftichios Sartzetakis ()

No 2002061, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We examine the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). We extend the existing literature by endogenizing the reaction of the IEAs members to a deviation by a member or a group of members. We assume that when a country contemplates exiting or joining an agreement, it takes into account the reactions of other countries ignited by its own actions. We identify conditions under which there always exists a unique set of farsighted stable IEAs. The new farsighted IEAs can be much larger than those some of the previous models supported but are not always Pareto efficient. We extend the analysis to allow for coordinated action, that is, groups of countries jointly exiting or entering the agreement and fully characterize the coalitionally farsighted stable IEAs.

Keywords: international environmental agreements; public good provision; coalition formation; foresight (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 H41 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

Downloads: (external link)
https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2002.html (text/html)

Related works:
Journal Article: International Environmental Agreements—The Role of Foresight (2018)
Working Paper: International Environmental Agreements-The Role of Foresight (2015)
Working Paper: International Environmental Agreements -The Role of Foresight
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvco:2002061

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().