International Environmental Agreements—The Role of Foresight

Effrosyni Diamantoudi and Eftichios Sartzetakis ()
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Effrosyni Diamantoudi: Concordia University

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2018, vol. 71, issue 1, No 11, 257 pages

Abstract: Abstract The present paper attempts to bridge the gap between the cooperative and the non-cooperative approach employed to examine the size of stable coalitions, formed to address global environmental problems. We do so by endowing countries with foresightedness, that is, by endogenizing the reaction of the coalition’s members to a deviation by one member. We assume that when a country contemplates withdrawing or joining an agreement, it takes into account the reactions of other countries ignited by its own actions. We identify conditions under which there always exists a unique set of farsighted stable IEAs. The new farsighted IEAs can be much larger than those some of the previous models supported but are not always Pareto efficient.

Keywords: Environmental agreements; Foresight; Stable set (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D6 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: International Environmental Agreements-The Role of Foresight (2015)
Working Paper: International environmental agreements - The role of foresight (2002)
Working Paper: International Environmental Agreements -The Role of Foresight
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-017-0148-1

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