On blocking coalitions: linking Mas-Colell with Grodal-Schmeidler-Vind

Joseph Greenberg, Shlomo Weber and Akira Yamazaki

No 2004060, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In this paper we investigate the question of how many coalitions of a given relative size would block a non-Walrasian allocation in large finite economies. It is shown that in finite economies, if a Pareto optimal allocation is bounded away from being Walrasian, then, for any two numbers [alpha], [beta], between 0 and 1, the proportion of blocking coalitions in the set of all coalitions with relative size between [alpha] and [beta], is arbitrarily close to 1/2, as the number of individuals in the economy becomes large.

Date: 2004-09
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